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COMPLICATIONS	 AND	 QUANDARIES	 IN	 THE	 ICT	 SECTOR:	 STANDARD	 ESSENTIAL	 PATENTS	 AND	












	 Today’s	 technology	 product	 markets,	 particularly	 in	 the	 information	 and	
communications	 technology	 (ICT)	 sector,	 are	 broadly	 international.	 Products	 designed	 in	
California	may	be	assembled	in	China	from	parts	sourced	in	Germany	for	sale	to	consumers	
in	 India.	 The	 global	 character	 of	 technology	 markets	 underscores	 the	 importance	 of	
technical	interoperability	standards	which	include	protocols	and	technologies	such	as	Wi-Fi	
and	Bluetooth	(wireless	networking),	4G	LTE	(wireless	telecommunications),	DVD	and	Blu-
Ray	 (digital	 media	 storage)	 and	 MP3/MP4	 (digital	 content	 encoding).	 These	 standards	




	 Patents	 covering	 technical	 standards	 have	 also	 taken	 on	 increasing	 importance	 in	
global	trade,	business	negotiations	and	relationships	among	firms.	 	This	chapter	considers	
the	 impact	 of	 patents	 on	 international	 technical	 standardization	 and	 the	 production	 of	
standards-compliant	 products.	 In	 particular,	 it	 assesses	 the	 impact	 that	 “standards-
essential”	patents	(SEPs)	have	had	on	individual	firm	behavior	and	intra-firm	dynamics.	 It	
also	evaluates	available	options	 to	reduce	disparities	between	those	 firms,	primarily	 from	






	 While	 many	 health,	 safety	 and	 environmental	 standards	 are	 developed	 by	
governmental	agencies,	the	vast	majority	of	technical	interoperability	standards	originate	in	
the	 private	 sector	 (Ernst	 2012,	 Biddle	 et	 al.	 2012).	 In	 the	 U.S.,	 there	 is	 an	 express	
governmental	 preference	 for	 privately-developed	 standards	 over	 government-developed	
standards,3	and	 elsewhere	 this	 preference	 has	 generally	 been	 supported	 by	 the	 market.	
																																																								
1 Earlier versions of this chapter have benefitted from presentation and discussion at the Workshop on Mega-
Regionalism: New Challenges for Trade and Innovation (MCTI) (Honolulu, January 20-21, 2016), the Conference on 
Innovation, Intellectual Property, Competition and Standard-Setting in the ICT Sector sponsored by Jindal Global 
University (New Delhi, August 20-21, 2016), and from helpful comments and discussion with Ashish Bharadwaj, 
Dieter Ernst and Brian Kahin. 
2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 117 (TBT Agreement) is 
designed to “ensure that technical regulations and standards … do not create unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.” See generally Bremer (2016). In general, such requirements pertain to the use of nationally-mandated health and 
safety standards to prevent free trade in products.  This body of law, which has prompted a significant academic 
literature, addresses a different set of concerns than the current chapter, which focuses on the ways in which voluntary 
technical standards and associated patents may advantage or disadvantage firms from different countries. 
3 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119 (1998). See Bremer (2016). 
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Some	 widely	 adopted	 interoperability	 standards	 (e.g.,	 Microsoft’s	 .doc	 and	 Adobe’s	 PDF	
electronic	document	formats)	are	single-firm	proprietary	formats	(de	facto	standards).	Over	
the	 past	 two	 decades,	 however,	 most	 successful	 interoperability	 standards	 have	 been	
developed	 by	 groups	 of	 firms	 that	 collaborate	 within	 voluntary	 associations	 known	 as	




	 SSOs	 vary	 greatly	 in	 size	 and	 composition.	 The	 European	 Commission	 (EC	 2014)	
identifies	three	broad	categories	of	SSO:			
	
	 (1)	 those	 that	 are	 formally	 recognized	 by	 governmental	 bodies.	 These	
include:	
	
international	 groups	 (e.g.,	 the	 International	 Organisiation	 for	






national	groups	(e.g.,	Germany’s	Deutsches	 Institut	 für	Normung	(DIN),	 the	








	 (3)	 smaller,	 privately-organized	 consortia	 (also	 known	 as	 special	 interest	









Standard	 Description	 SSO	 EC	Class	
802.11	 Wireless	networking	 IEEE	 2	
Bluetooth	 Short-range	wireless	networking	 Bluetooth	SIG	 3	
CD	 Compact	disc	(digital	media)	 n/a6	 n/a	
																																																								
4 The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) presents a somewhat unusual case, inasmuch as it is a private 
organization which is recognized in certain capacities by the U.S. government. ANSI oversees, accredits and 
establishes policy for national SSOs that wish to develop American National Standards.  Among other things, ANSI-
accredited SSOs must adopt due process and intellectual property policies that comply with ANSI’s “Essential 
Requirements”. 
5 Updegrove (2015) catalogs more than 1,000 such groups. 
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DVB	 Digital	video	broadcast	(Europe)	 DVB	Forum	 1	
DVD	 Digital	media	 n/a8	 n/a	
Ethernet	 Device	networking	 IEEE	 2	
GPS	 Global	Positioning	System	 n/a9	 n/a	
GSM		 2G	wireless	telecommunications	 ETSI	 1	
H.264	 Audiovideo	encoding	 ITU	 1	
HDMI	 High-definition	multimedia	interface	 HDMI	Forum	 3	
HDTV	 High-definition	broadcast	tv	(US)	 ATSC	 3	
HTTP	 Hypertext	transfer	protocol	 W3C	 2	
IP	 Internet	protocol	 IETF	 2	




PDF	 Portable	Document	Format	 n/a10	 n/a	
SDRAM	 Semiconductor	memory	 JEDEC	 2	
UMTS	 3G	wireless	telecommunications	 ETSI/3GPP	 1	
USB	 Device	networking	 USB	Forum	 3	
V.90	 56k	modem	 ITU	 1	
VHS	 Video	cassette	media	 n/a11	 n/a	
WWW	 Worldwide	web	 W3C	 2	







basis,	 so	 that	each	member	state	has	a	delegation	 that	 represents	 its	 interests	at	 the	SSO.		
Criteria	for	participation	in	a	national	delegation	are	determined	at	the	national	level.		The	









basis.	 Participation	 depends	 on	 firms’	 interest	 in	 the	 relevant	 area	 of	 standardization,	 as	
																																																																																																																																																																					
6 The CD specification was developed primarily by Philips and Sony. 
7 CDMA technology was initially developed by Qualcomm, which then submitted it for adoption to the 
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA). 
8 The DVD specification was developed primarily by Philips, Sony, Toshiba and Panasonic. 
9 The GPS standard was originally developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. 
10 PDF is a proprietary format developed by Adobe. 
11 The VHS format was developed by Matsushita/JVC. 
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well	 as	 its	 ability	 to	 bear	 the	 not	 insignificant	 personnel,	 travel	 and	 technology	 costs	
associated	 with	 SSO	 participation.	 It	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 large	 global	 technology	 firms	




last	decade,	Chinese	 firms	have	dramatically	 increased	 their	participation	 in	 international	
SSOs,	in	some	sectors	surpassing	participation	from	all	countries	other	than	the	U.S.	(Ernst	




in	developing	a	specific	 technology	or	standard.	 	Often	 these	“founder”	or	 “sponsor”	 firms	
hold	patents	relevant	to	the	technology	in	question	(Biddle	et	al.	2012).	Such	founders	are	
typically	 large	multinational	 firms	with	substantial	patent	portfolios,	but	may	also	 include	
smaller,	 specialized	 firms	 focusing	 on	 the	 target	 technology	 area	 and	 large	 industry	
participants	that	manufacture	products	or	systems	that	will	be	dependent	on	the	standard,	








	 As	 noted	 above,	 standards	 are	 sets	 of	 protocols	 and	 technical	 descriptions	 of	
product	features	that	enable	product	 interoperability.	While	standards	themselves	are	not	
patentable,	products	that	are	compliant	with	the	technical	requirements	of	standards	(often	
referred	 to	as	 standards-compliant	products)	generally	 satisfy	 the	statutory	 requirements	
for	 patent	 protection.	 The	 owners	 of	 patents	 covering	 these	 standardized	 technologies	
(referred	 to	 as	 standard-essential	 patents	 or	 “SEPs”)	 are	 often	 the	 firms	 and	 institutions	
that	employ	individuals	who	make	particular	inventive	contributions	to	standards.		Some	of	
these	 contributions	may	 be	made	 jointly	 and	 owned	by	multiple	 firms,	 but	 in	most	 cases	
firms	 individually	submit	 technical	contributions	 to	 the	standard-setting	process	and	own	
the	resulting	SEPs.			
	
	 Because	 standards	 documents	 are	 often	 quite	 lengthy	 and	 complex,	 sometimes	




LTE	 (1000	patent	 families),	MPEG-2	 and	MPEG-4	 (160	patent	 families),	 optical	 disc	 drive	
standards	(2200	patent	families),	and	DVB-H	(30	patent	families)).			
	
 Ordinarily,	 if	 the	vendor	of	a	product	 that	 infringes	a	patent	 is	unable,	or	does	not	
wish,	 to	obtain	a	 license	on	 the	 terms	offered	by	 the	patent	holder,	 that	vendor	has	 three	
																																																								
12 A patent “family” consists of all individual patents deriving from a single, initial patent application.  These may 
include individual patents in multiple countries, as well as multiple patents in the same country derived from the same 
initial application (e.g., continuation, continuation-in-part and divisional applications in the U.S.). 
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choices:	 to	 stop	 selling	 the	 infringing	 product,	 to	 design	 around	 the	 patent,	 or	 do	neither	
and	 risk	 liability	 as	 an	 infringer.	With	 standards-compliant	 products,	 however,	 designing	
around	the	patent	may	be	impossible	or	economically	infeasible.	Moreover,	once	a	standard	
is	approved	and	released	by	an	SSO,	market	participants	may	make	significant	investments	




licensing	 rates.	 This	 phenomenon	 has	 been	 termed	 patent	 “hold-up”	 and	 is	 discussed	
extensively	in	the	literature	((Lemley	&	Shapiro	2007,	Contreras	2016).		
	
As	 noted	 above,	 complex	 technological	 products	 may	 implement	 dozens,	 if	 not	
hundreds,	of	standards	each	of	which	may	be	covered	by	hundreds	or	thousands	of	patents.	
As	such,	the	aggregation	of	royalty	demands	by	multiple	patent	holders	could	lead	to	cost-





Over	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 SSOs	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	
patents	covering	standardized	technologies	and	the	perceived	threats	of	patent	hold-up	and	
stacking	by	adopting	a	 series	of	policy	measures	 intended	 to	address	 these	concerns.	SSO	
patent	 policies	 today	 fall	 into	 two	 general	 categories:	 disclosure	 policies	 and	 licensing	
policies,	 and	 often	 include	 elements	 of	 both.	 Disclosure	 policies	 typically	 require	
participants	 in	 the	 standards	 development	 process	 to	 disclose	 SEPs	 that	 they	 hold.	
Licensing	 policies	 typically	 require	 that	 participants	 grant	manufacturers	 of	 standardized	
products	 licenses	 under	 their	 SEPs	 on	 terms	 that	 are	 “fair,	 reasonable	 and	
nondiscriminatory”	(FRAND)	or	royalty-free	(RF).	
	
These	 commitments	 purport	 to	 assure	 manufacturers	 that	 they	 will	 be	 able	 to	
obtain	 licenses	 (which	 may	 sometimes	 involve	 a	 payment)	 to	 sell	 standards-compliant	
products	covered	by	SEPs.	Perhaps,	in	part,	because	FRAND	commitments	require	relatively	
little	 administrative	 overhead	 to	 enact,	 their	 use	 has	 become	 widespread	 among	 SSOs.13	
Nevertheless,	 a	 consistent,	 practical,	 and	 readily	 enforceable	 definition	 of	 FRAND	 has	
proven	 difficult	 to	 achieve.	 No	 SSO	 defines	 precisely	 what	 FRAND	 means,	 and	 many	
affirmatively	disclaim	any	role	in	establishing,	reviewing,	or	assessing	the	reasonableness	of	
FRAND	 licensing	 terms.	 This	 lack	 of	 certainty	 has	 contributed	 to	 recent	 litigation	 over	







	 Over	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 there	 has	 been	 a	 sharp	 increase	 in	 patenting	 within	
certain	 technology	 standardization	 sectors,	 particularly	 wireless	 telecommunications	
(Bekkers	&	West	2009).		In	addition,	a	core	group	of	firms	in	the	telecommunications	sector	
																																																								
13 FRAND commitments (or similar commitments to license patents on a royalty-free basis) are required of all 






that	 patenting	 behavior	 is	 not	 concentrated	 among	 firms	 of	 any	 one	 country,	 but	 is	
distributed	at	least	among	firms	based	in	the	major	developed	economies	(U.S.	(Qualcomm,	
InterDigital	 and	 Motorola),	 Korea	 (LG	 and	 Samsung),	 Europe	 (Nokia	 and	 Ericsson),	 and	
China	(Huawei)).14	
	
	 When	considering	 levels	of	patent	 acquisition,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 a	 firm’s	
home	jurisdiction	is	relatively	immaterial	to	the	jurisdictions	in	which	it	seeks	and	obtains	
patents.	 	 That	 is,	 a	 large	 firm	with	 a	 global	 market	 is	 likely	 to	 seek	 patents	 in	 all	 major	
markets,	 no	matter	where	 it	 is	 based.	 	 Thus,	 in	 2014,	 the	 ten	 firms	 to	which	 the	 greatest	
number	 of	 U.S.	 patents	 were	 awarded	 were:	 IBM	 (US),	 Samsung	 (Korea),	 Canon	 (Japan),	
Sony	(Japan),	Microsoft	(US),	Toshiba	(Japan),	Qualcomm	(US),	Google	(US),	LG	(Korea)	and	
Panasonic	(Japan)	(USPTO	2015).	 	It	 is	likely	that	a	comparable	distribution	exists	in	most	
other	 jurisdictions,	with	at	most	a	modest	“head	start”	advantage	 for	 local	 firms.	 	Thus,	 in	
India,	research	conducted	by	the	author	and	the	Centre	for	Internet	and	Society	has	found	





all	 patents),	 firms	 can	 be	 classified	 as	 either	 “Haves”	 or	 “Have-nots”.	 The	 Haves	 are	
generally	large	multinational	technology-focused	firms	based	in	North	America,	Europe	and	
the	Asia	Pacific	economies.15		The	 “Have-Nots”	are	all	others.16	It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	
not	 all	 firms	 based	 in	 these	 key	 jurisdictions	 are	 Haves.	 	 Smaller	 firms	 and	 new	market	
entrants	 in	 developed	 economies	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 be	Have-Nots.	 	 Likewise,	 not	 all	 firms	
based	 in	developing	 economies	 are,	 or	must	 remain,	Have-Nots.	 	 A	 prominent	 example	 is	
China-based	 Huawei	 which,	 in	 the	 span	 of	 just	 a	 few	 years,	 rose	 from	 insignificance	 to	













14 Though Japanese firms such as Sony, Toshiba, Sharp and Panasonic have played major roles in many areas of 
ICT standardization, particularly consumer electronics and digital media, they are comparatively underrepresented in 
telecommunications and networking SSOs, due largely to early policies adopted by the Japanese government 
(Contreras 2014). 
15 As Ernst et al (2014) observe, “As technologies become more complex and inter-related, advanced countries 
have pre-empted fundamental technologies by aggressive patenting” (p. 856). 
16 For more comprehensive discussions of patent disparities among firms in developing versus developed 









products	 in	 their	 own	 countries	 (possibly	 with	 locally-attractive	 features,	 lower	 costs	 or	









an	 international	 basis,	may	 be	 viewed	 as	 excessive	 in	 local	markets.	 	 The	 royalty	 burden	
owed	 to	 foreign	 firms	 can	 thus	be	viewed	as	 inequitable	by	 local	 firms	and	governments,	
particularly	if	foreign	Have	firms	enter	the	market	and	compete	with	or	displace	local	Have-
Not	 firms	 (Ernst	 2015).17		 The	 perception	 of	 unfairness	 can	 be	 exacerbated	when	 foreign	
firms	 actively	 enforce	 their	 patents	 against	 local	 market	 participants	 in	 their	 domestic	
markets.	 This	 situation	 has	 recently	 occurred	 in	 India	 where,	 over	 the	 past	 three	 years,	
multinational	 telecommunications	 vendor	 Ericsson	 has	 brought	 patent	 infringement	 suits	








have	 significantly	 negative	 effects	 on	 local	 firms	 and	 innovation	 (Ernst	 et	 al	 2014,	 861)	
Accordingly,	 a	 range	 of	 responses,	 both	 public	 and	 private,	 have	 been	 proposed	 to	 the	
perceived	 disparity	 in	 SEP	 holdings	 between	 foreign	 Have	 firms	 and	 domestic	 Have-Not	
firms	 in	 less-developed	 countries.	 In	 many	 cases,	 these	 responses	 are	 not	 mutually	










17 In addition, the royalty burden on local Have-Not firms is often greater than the burden on other foreign Have 
firms that hold patents that may be used as bargaining chips in cross-licenses with other Have firms.  The result is that 
Have firms that have entered into cross-licensing networks generally have a low monetary royalty burden as compared 





This	 is	 potential	 is	 particularly	 salient	 in	 the	 area	 of	 technical	 standardization,	 in	
which	SSO	participation	is,	in	many	cases,	open	to	all	interested	organizations	irrespective	
of	 national	 origin.	 	 The	 success	 of	 firms	 from	 small	 countries	 (e.g.,	 Philips	 (Netherlands),	
Nokia	(Finland)	and	Ericsson	(Sweden)),	and	from	developing	economies	(e.g.,	Huawei	and	
ZTE	 (China))	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 “club”	 of	 successful	market	 entrants	 is	 not	 limited	 to	






dominated	 the	wireless	 telecommunications	 standards	 field,	 and	 Chinese	 firms	 balked	 at	
the	high	royalty	rates	charged	by	these	firms	(Ernst,	2011;	Vialle	et	al.	2012).		In	response,	




its	 state-owned	affiliate	Datang	 in	 collaboration	with	German	equipment	vendor	Siemens.	
Though	TD-SCDMA	 is	 not	 generally	 viewed	 as	 a	 technological	 or	market	 success,	 the	TD-
SCDMA	 experience	 appears	 to	 have	 advanced	 China’s	 goal	 of	 building	 domestic	 technical	
expertise,	 patent	 leverage	 and	 manufacturing	 capacity	 for	 advanced	 telecommunications	
products	 (Vialle	 et	 al.	 2012).	 The	 cost	 of	 China’s	 indigenous	 standardization	 program,	








by	 foreign	 interests,	 a	 natural	 reaction	 is	 to	 implement	 regulations,	 and	 undertake	
enforcement	 actions,	 intended	 to	 protect	 the	 local	 industry.	 Of	 course,	 expressly	
protectionist	 regulation	 in	 the	 area	 of	 intellectual	 property	 generally	 flies	 in	 the	 face	 of	
widely-adopted	 international	 treaty	 obligations	 such	 as	 the	 WTO	 Agreement	 on	 Trade-
Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 (the	 TRIPS	 Agreement),19	as	well	 as	more	
recent	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 trade	 agreements	 such	 as	 the	 Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	




18 China also submitted TD-SCDMA to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for recognition as an 
international standard, and the ITU approved TD-SCDMA in 2000.			 
19 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 15 April 1994, in World Trade Organization, The 
Legal Texts: The Results of The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 321 (1999), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
20 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Chapter 8 (Technical Barriers to Trade). 




against	 foreign	 entities.	 	 There	 has	 been	 a	 spate	 of	 recent	 competition	 law	 investigations	
and	 enforcement	 actions	 against	 large	Western	 holders	 of	 standards-essential	 patents	 in	
China,	Korea	and	India.22	For	example,	in	February	2015,	China’s	National	Development	and	
Reform	Commission	(“NDRC”)	fined	Qualcomm	approximately	US$975	million	for	a	host	of	
alleged	 violations	 of	 China’s	 Antimonopoly	 Law	 in	 connection	 with	 its	 licensing	 of	
standards-essential	 patents.	 The	 Korean	 Fair	 Trade	 Commission	 is	 also	 reported	 to	 be	
investigating	Qualcomm.	  And in India, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has 
investigated Ericsson in connection with Ericsson’s patent infringement suits against 
Indian and Chinese manufacturers of mobile phones for the domestic Indian market (DIPP	
2016,	Contreras	&	Lakshané	2016).	
	
A	 final	way	 that	 governments	 can	 seek	 to	 reduce	 the	dominance	of	 foreign	patent	
holders	 in	 domestic	 markets	 is	 through	 the	 imposition	 of	 compulsory	 licensing	 for	
particular	 patents	 or	 products.	 	 This	 power,	 which	 is	 permitted	 under	 TRIPS	 in	 special	
circumstances,	 has	 to-date	 been	 exercised	 primarily	 in	 pharmaceutical	 markets	 in	
developing	 economies	 (Ragavan	 2016,	 Ch.	 2).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 possibility	 of	 compulsory	
licensing	 exists	 in	 other	 industries	 that	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 health,	 safety	 and	
welfare	of	local	populations	(id;	Contreras	&	McManis	2014).		In	response	to	the	dominance	
of	 the	 local	 Indian	mobile	devices	market	by	 foreign	patent	holders,	 some	have	proposed	





As	 the	 competitive	 advantage	 possessed	 by	 Have	 firms	 derives	 to	 a	 large	 degree	
from	patents	on	standardized	technology,	some	have	suggested	that	 it	would	benefit	 local	
firms	to	increase	their	own	patenting	activity	(Ramel	&	Blind	2015).		Increased	patenting	by	
local	 firms	 would,	 it	 is	 argued,	 give	 such	 firms	 greater	 bargaining	 power	 in	 licensing	
negotiations	with	existing	Have	firms.	While	this	conclusion	is	correct	on	a	theoretical	level,	
it	may	oversimplify	the	issue.	 	The	acquisition	of	patents	is	not	itself	a	productive	activity,	





Not	 firms	 should	 seek	 not	 to	 increase	 their	 patenting	 activity,	 but	 their	 participation	 in	
international	standardization	activities	 (see	VI.E	below).	 	 If	 they	do,	 their	ability	 to	obtain	
patents	covering	their	technical	contributions	should	follow.			
																																																																																																																																																																					
could block innovation should be considered in a latecomer context as one of the criteria to assess success in 
standardization” (p. 858). 
22 To some degree, these investigations echo similar investigations by U.S. and European competition law 
authorities. 
23 This point is underscored by Ernst et al (2014), who argue that “IPR protection can only contribute to economic 
development if it takes place as part of a multi-faceted innovation strategy that seeks to strengthen absorptive and 
innovative capabilities of firms, and to develop a broad-based innovation infrastructure (including standards)” (p. 858, 
citations omitted). 
24 While individual firms often develop technologies internally which they then bring to SSOs for standardization, 
a significant amount of revision, compromise and development also occurs within the collaborative SSO setting. 
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It	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 separate	 question	 whether	 local	 governments	 should	 facilitate	
patenting	by	domestic	providers.	 	Doing	so	 in	a	manner	that	discriminates	against	 foreign	
firms	 would	 generally	 run	 afoul	 of	 TRIPS	 and	 other	 treaty	 obligations.25	However,	 as	
discussed	 in	 the	next	 section,	governments	can	help	 their	domestic	 industry	engage	more	






international	 SSOs.26		 First,	 as	 observed	by	Büthe	 and	Mattli	 (2011,	 9,	 211-12),	 firms	 that	
embed	 their	 proprietary	 technology	 into	 industry	 standards	 early	 during	 the	
standardization	 process	 can	 realize	 significant	 market	 gains	 and	 strategic	 advantages.	
Second,	 SSO	 participants	 can	 influence	 the	 direction	 of	 standardized	 technologies	 in	 a	
manner	 that	 favors,	 or	 at	 least	 takes	 into	 consideration,	 local	 markets	 and	 local	
technology/patent	 positions.	 Involvement	 in	 charting	 the	 future	 direction	 of	 technology	
standards	can	also	give	firms	insight	 into	and	advance	notice	of	product	development	and	
evolution	 opportunities.	 Participation	 may	 also	 give	 local	 firms	 opportunities	 to	 export	





opportunities	 to	 influence	 SSO	 policies	 and	 practices,	 particularly	 in	 ways	 that	 might	
facilitate	licensing	and	technology	dissemination	in	developing	markets.	 	For	example,	SSO	
policies	 could	 provide	 that	 offering	 lower	 royalty	 rates	 for	 deployment	 of	 standards-
compliant	products	in	developing	markets	would	not	violate	the	SSO’s	requirement	of	non-




exceptions,	Have-Not	 firms	have	not	 yet	made	meaningful	 and	 sustained	 contributions	 in	
these	organizations.	This	absence	is	rendered	the	more	notable	by	express	policies	intended	
to	 ensure	 broad	 participation	 in	 such	 SSOs.	 For	 example,	 participation	 in	 international	
Category	I	SSOs	such	as	ISO	and	ITU	is	often	determined	on	a	national	basis.28	The	national	
delegations	 to	 bodies	 such	 as	 these	 present	 good	 opportunities	 for	 involvement	 by	 firms	
from	 less-developed	 countries.	 	 Some	Category	 I	 SSOs	 such	as	ETSI,	 and	most	Category	 II	
SSOs,	such	as	 IEEE,	ASTM	and	IETF	are,	by	their	own	policies,	open	to	participation	by	all	
																																																								
25 These obligations require local patent offices to afford “national treatment” to foreign applicants, treating them 
on the same basis as local applicants. 
26 Ernst et al (2014) focus on the development of national standardization policies within developing countries that 
blend elements of the industry-led U.S. approach and more nationalized approaches adopted in China and Korea (p. 
861).  This approach has much to recommend it.  However, the recommendation of this chapter differs from that of 
Ernst et al (2014) in that it emphasizes the engagement of Have-Not firms in international standardization activities, 
rather than the development of specific national standardization policies.  
27 Major research universities around the world have adopted a similar stance in a 2007 document entitled “In the 
Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology”.  The “Nine Points” document expressly 
acknowledges that “responsible licensing includes consideration of the needs of people in developing countries and 
members of other underserved populations”. 
28 See Part I, above. 
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interested	 organizations.	 Accordingly,	 the	 only	 barriers	 to	 participation	 in	 these	 SSOs,	
which	represent	a	significant	portion	of	global	standardization	activity,29	arise	from	a	lack	of	
technical	 skill,	 financial	 resources	 and	 interest	 among	Have-Not	 firms.	 These	 deficiencies	
are,	of	course,	very	real	and	very	serious.	However,	as	discussed	below,	financial	barriers	to	
participation	 can	 be	 overcome,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 through	 national	 and	 philanthropic	
programs	 that	 provide	 resources	 for	 technical	 training	 and	 participation	 in	 international	
SSOs.	 The	 example	 of	 Chinese	 firms	 such	 as	Huawei	 and	 ZTE	 (Contreras	 2014),	 illustrate	
that	 it	 is	possible	 for	 local	 firms,	with	sufficient	determination,	governmental	support	and	









entire	chapter	devoted	 to	 standards,	 its	goal	 is	ensuring	 that	 locally-developed	standards,	
generally	 those	 relating	 to	 health	 and	 safety,	 are	 open	 and	 transparent	 and	 do	 not	
discriminate	 against	 foreign	 producers.31		 The	 standards	 focus	 of	 the	 TPP	 is	 thus	 inward	











More	 important	 than	 trade	 agreements,	 however,	 may	 be	 international	 and	 local	




come	 cheaply	 and	 requires	 significant	 financial	 and	 institutional	 support	 (Bremer	 2016).		
For	Have-Not	 firms	 lacking	 the	 internal	resources	 to	 fund	such	 training	and	development,	
such	support	must	come	 from	external	 sources.	 	These	sources	could	 include	grants	 from	
local	 governments,	 non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 and	 multi-governmental	
organizations	(e.g.,	the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organization	(WIPO)).		
																																																								
29 Because Category 3 SSOs (consortia) are typically formed by small groups of firms with an existing technology 
and patent position, it is not realistic to hope that they will be fruitful avenues for greater Have-Not firm participation. 
30 Of course, China recently underwent a phase during which it concentrated significant resources on the 
development of local standards without heavy foreign patent coverage (see Part V.B, above, discussing initiatives such 
as China’s TD-SCDMA 3G mobile telephony effort, as well as Ernst (2011), which details several such efforts).  While 
many would argue that these efforts were ultimately of limited success, it is possible that they did serve the goal of 
preparing Chinese firms to participate in international standardization efforts. 







regularly	 sponsors	 a	 number	 of	 Fellows	 from	developing	 countries	 to	 participate	 in	 IETF	
meetings	 and	 other	 activities.32	The	 Kolkata	 chapter	 of	 ISOC	 sponsors	 an	 express	 “Indian	
IETF	 Capacity	 Building	 Program”. 33 	Other	 SSOs	 sponsor	 participation	 by	 consumer	
advocates	and	other	community	representatives	(Bremer	2016).		Program	such	as	these	can	
be	underwritten	by	SSO	membership	dues	as	well	as	fees	charged	for	published	standards.	




Another	 component	of	governmental	 and	 institutional	 support	 for	 standardization	
is	educational.	Countries	such	as	India	already	possess	world-class	educational	institutions	




to	 promote	 curriculum	 and	 program	 development	 relating	 to	 standards,	 and	 itself	 offers	
















India’s	 2016	National	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 Policy	 emphasizes	 the	 need	 for	
capacity	 building	 in	 numerous	 areas	 including	 IP	 prosecution,	 enforcement	 and	 policy	




The	 support	 mechanisms	 described	 in	 Part	 VI.F	 above	 may	 seem	 superfluous	 in	
India,	 which	 is	 already	 a	 major	 market	 for	 ICT	 products	 and	 possesses	 sophisticated	





34 See www.nist.gov. 
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Indian	government’s	Bureau	of	Indian	Standards	(BIS)	conducts	standardization	activity	in	
fourteen	 industry	 sectors	 including	 computer	 communications,	 networks	 and	 interfaces	
(DIPP	2016).		The	Telecommunications	Engineering	Center	(TEC)	operated	by	the	Ministry	
of	 Communications	 and	 Information	 Technology	 coordinates	 with	 international	 SSOs	
including	ETSI,	ITU,	IEEE	and	IETF	in	developing	telecommunications	standards	(ibid).		And	
private	 trade	 associations	 such	 as	 the	 Telecom	 Standards	 Development	 Society	 of	 India	
(TSDSI),	 the	 Global	 ICT	 Standardization	 Forum	 for	 India	 (GISFI),	 and	 the	 Development	





inhibits	 greater	 direct	 Indian	 participation	 in	 international	 SSOs.	 The	 seemingly	
sophisticated	 network	 of	 Indian	 standardization	 activities	 may	 have	 made	 the	 Indian	
government	 and	 industry	 somewhat	 complacent	 about	 participation	 in	 leading	
international	 standardization	 efforts.	 But	 these	 activities	 are	 by	 no	 means	 equivalent	 in	
importance	or	 impact.	 	While	domestic	standardization	efforts	may	 facilitate	 the	adoption	
and	 adaptation	 of	 international	 standards	 for	 local	 Indian	 needs	 (admittedly,	 a	 necessary	
function),	they	appear	largely	to	follow	the	lead	of	the	dominant	international	SSOs,	rather	
than	 participate	 in	 this	 leadership.	 	 Participation	 in	 domestic	 standardization	 activities	 is	
thus	no	 substitute	 for	 active	 engagement	 at	 the	 international	 SSO	 level.	 	 Thus,	 the	 Indian	
government	and	private	standards	groups	could	increase	their	prominence	internationally	





	 Patents	 on	 standardized	 technologies	 are	 being	 issued	with	 increasing	 frequency,	
and	the	majority	of	these	patents	are	held	by	large	multinational	firms	based	in	developed	
economies.	As	 a	 result,	 firms	 from	 less-developed	economies	with	 sparse	patent	holdings	
are	disadvantaged	in	both	domestic	and	foreign	markets.		While	protectionist	governmental	
policies	 can	 address	 these	 disparities,	 such	 measures	 are	 potentially	 contrary	 to	
international	treaty	obligations	and	generally	unsuccessful	in	the	long	term.		An	alternative	
approach	involves	greater	participation	in	international	SSOs	by	firms	from	less-developed	
economies.	 This	 increased	 participation	 is	 likely	 to	 benefit	 such	 firms	 both	 in	 terms	 of	
technology	development,	strengthening	of	patent	positions,	and	influence	over	SSO	policies.	
To	 facilitate	 increased	 participation,	 both	 financial	 and	 institutional	 support	 will	 be	
required	from	local	governments,	NGOs,	multinational	organizations	and	SSOs	themselves.		
To	 the	 extent	 that	 participation	 in	 international	 SSOs	 by	 firms	 in	 developing	 economies		





35 The author understands that one of the goals of TSDSI is to engage actively in the work of international SSOs. 
However, the impact of this relatively new organization remains to be seen.  Moreover, it appears that the membership 
of TSDSI may consist largely of the Indian affiliates of foreign technology firms, which may not do much to increase 
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